Full article: The perception/cognition distinction - Taylor ...

Paradigms on each side are perhaps clear enough. From perception: seeing the colours and locations of nearby objects, and kindred low-level perception. From ... SkiptoMainContent Searchin: ThisJournal Anywhere Advancedsearch Inquiry AnInterdisciplinaryJournalofPhilosophy LatestArticles Submitanarticle Journalhomepage 1,199 Views 0 CrossRefcitationstodate 0 Altmetric Listen Review Theperception/cognitiondistinctionAndersNesaDepartmentofPhilosophyandReligiousStudies,NorwegianUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Trondheim,NorwayCorrespondenceanders.nes@ntnu.noViewfurtherauthorinformation,KristofferSundbergbDepartmentofPedagogical,CurricularandProfessionalStudies,UniversityofGothenburg,Gothenburg,SwedenViewfurtherauthorinformation&SebastianWatzlcDepartmentofPhilosophy,Classics,HistoryofArtandIdeas,UniversityofOslo,Oslo,NorwayViewfurtherauthorinformation Received05Dec2020Accepted05Jan2021Publishedonline:25May2021 Downloadcitation https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1926317 CrossMark InthisarticleCloseABSTRACT1.Introduction2.Phenomenalcharacter3.Representation4.Cognitivearchitecture5.World-Relation6.Theshapeofanaccountoftheperception/cognitiondistinction:someoptionsAcknowledgementsDisclosurestatementAdditionalinformationFootnotesReferences Review Theperception/cognitiondistinction FullArticle Figures&data References Citations Metrics Licensing Reprints&Permissions PDF EPUB ABSTRACTABSTRACTThedifferencebetweenperceptionandcognitionseemsintrospectivelyobviousinmanycases.Perceivingandthinkinghavealsobeenassignedquitedifferentroles,inepistemology,intheoriesofreferenceandofmentalcontent,inphilosophyofpsychology,andelsewhere.Yetwhatisthenatureofthedistinction?Inwhatway,orways,doperceptionandcognitiondiffer?Thepaperreviewsrecentworkonthesequestions.Fourmainrespectsinwhichperceptionandcognitionhavebeenheldtodifferarediscussed.First,theirphenomenalcharacter,suchastheoften-remarkedvivacityorimmediacyofperception.Second,thewayinwhichtheyrepresenttheworld,e.g.thenon-propositionalnatureofthecontents,ornon-discursivecharacterofthevehicles,thathavebeenheldtocharacteriseperceptualrepresentation.Third,theirplaceincognitivearchitecture,i.e.,roughly,intheinformation-flowofthemind,suchastheiralleged(non-)modularity.Fourth,theirmind-worldrelations,e.g.thewayinwhichperceptionsseemtobetightlycausallylinkedwithdistalorproximalstimuli.Againstthisbackground,wedistinguishsomemainoptionsforanaccountoftheperception/cognitiondistinction,inparticularconcerningwhetherthereisone,several,ornointerestingandprincipleddistinction(s)tobedrawnhere.KEYWORDS:Perception/cognitiondistinctionperceptualphenomenologyperceptualrepresentationmodularityperceptionandcausation 1.IntroductionHowdoesperceptiondifferfromcognition?Itseemsplainthatperceptionandcognitiondiffer;atleast,paradigmsofeachclass–seeinganearbytree,thinkingaboutdinneroptions–seemclearlydifferent.Butgivinganaccountoftheirdifferenceis,perhapssurprisingly,difficult.Thispaperwillprovideareviewofdebatesontheperception/cognitiondistinction.Why,though,careaboutthisdistinction?First,perceptionandcognitionhavebeenassignedquitedifferentroles.Perceptionshaveforexamplebeenheldtojustifybeliefswithoutthemselvesrequiringjustification,aprivilegerarelyextendedtomerebeliefs(cf.,e.g.Pryor2000).Perceptionhasbeenheldtoenablereferencetoparticulars(cf.Strawson1959;Campbell2002),orprovidecontenttocertainconcepts,suchascolourconcepts(Peacocke1992),inawayinwhichthoughtalonecouldnot.Ontheotherhand,cognitionseemstoenjoyafreedomandflexibilitywithregardstoitsobjectsdeniedtoperception,reachingintotheremotepastanddistantfuture,thepurelyabstract,thefictional,andarcanetheoreticalposits.Second,thequestionwhatdistinguishesperceptionfromcognitionconnectswiththatofwheretheborderbetweenthemlies.Indebatesonhigh-levelperception,itisagreedthatsuitablyskilledperceiversquicklyandeffortlesslycanspotthenaturalkinds(Siegel2010),meanings(cf.,e.g.Drożdżowiczthisissue),emotionsorintentions(cf.,e.g.Helton2018),orevenmoralproperties(cf.,e.g.BergqvistandCowan2018)ofperceivedobjectsorevents.Yetdothesesubjectsgenuinelyperceive,ormerelyswiftlycognize,theseproperties?Togetahandleonthis,weneedagriponwhatmarkstheperceptualasopposedtothecognitiveorviceversa.Third,thedistinctionisvitalalsotothegrandpsychological-cum-philosophicalprojectofchartingthebasicstructureofmind.Willperceptionversuscognitionturnouttobeajointinpsychologicalnature,e.g.aninflectionpointincognitivearchitecture(cf.Fodor1983)orformofrepresentation(cf.BlockMS),oramatterofcontinuitymorethanofdivision(cf.,e.g.Clark2016)?Finally,theperception/cognitiondistinctionhaslongloomedlargeinWesternphilosophy.InTheRepublic,Platocomparessensibleobjectsofknowledgeunfavourablywithintelligibleones,and,inTheaetetus,arguesatlengththatknowledgeisnotperception.IntheAristotelian,andlaterThomistic,traditions,thedistinctionislinkedwithametaphysicaldivisionbetweentwoformsofsoul:asensitiveform,sharedwithbrutes,versusarationalform,whichmay,perhapsinpart,aspiretoimmortality.Theperception/cognitiondistinctionbecomespivotalinearlymodernphilosophy,withrationalistsandempiriciststakingopposingviewsastoonwhichofitssidesliethechiefsourcesandresourcesofknowledge.However,opposingpartiesheresometimesagreeinthinkingaboutthedifferencebetweensensoryandintellectualstatesasgradationsonascale.Leibniz(1982,81)contrastssensoryrepresentationsasconfusedwithintellectualonesasdistinct,whileHume(1739/2000,SB1-2)comparesimpressionsandideasonthescalesofforceandvivacity.SuchgradualistconceptionsarerejectedbyKant,whosecriticalphilosophyisstructuredbyabasicdifferenceinkindbetweenconceptsandintuitions,andbetweenunderstanding(‘spontaneity’)andsensibility(‘receptivity’)asthefacultiestowhichtheyrespectivelybelong.Prominentstreamsofpost-Kantianthought,e.g.Hegelian,havelabouredto‘overcome’thisdualism.Whileitsrichhistorystillanimatesaninterestinthedistinction,surveyingtherelevanttraditionsisbeyondthescopeofthisreview,andwewillfocusoncontributionsfromthelastfifteen-oddyears.How,though,shouldthecategoriesof‘perception’and‘cognition’beunderstoodaswesetouttoexploreanydifferences?Paradigmsoneachsideareperhapsclearenough.Fromperception:seeingthecoloursandlocationsofnearbyobjects,andkindredlow-levelperception.Fromcognition:thinking,reasoning,problem-solving,andplanning.Asalways,therewillbeborderlinecases.Greaterelucidationoftherespectivecategoriesofperceptionandcognitionmayhoweverfacilitatehowthesearetobeclassified.Aclearaccountofwhatperceptionandcognitionareisthegoal,notthestartingpoint.Sections2–5lookatrespectsinwhichperceptionsandcognitionshavebeensupposedtodiffer.Specifically,section2considersphenomenology,section3representation,section4cognitivearchitecture,andsection5mind-worldrelations.1Buildingonthis,section6seekstomapoutsomemainoptionsforanaccountoftheperception/cognitiondistinction.2.PhenomenalcharacterOnepointofentrytotheperception/cognitiondistinctionisthewayperceptionandcognitionrespectivelyfeeltothesubject.Thereis,onemightthink,atleastinparadigmcases,adifferenceinconsciouscharacterherethatisevidentfromthefirst-personperspective.So,anyway,Humeseemstohavesupposed,maintainingthateveryone‘willreadilyperceivethedifferencebetwixtfeelingandthinking’(Hume1739/2000,SB1).Onesimpleviewofthissortisthatwhileperception–intheguiseofperceptualexperience–hasphenomenalcharacter,cognitionjustlacksanythingofthesort.Thus,cognitionwouldinadramaticsensehavethefeaturesofunforcefulnessandunlivelinessHumeassignedtoideas.However,itisnownotuncommontoacceptthatcognitionalsohasoneoranotherformofphenomenalcharacter,i.e.thatthereiscognitivephenomenology,inoneoranothersenseofthatterm(cf.,e.g.BayneandMontague2011).Moreover,evensettingthatpointaside,thesimpleviewpromisesaratherunrevealingaccountoftheperception/cognitiondistinction,notgroundedonanypositivefeatureofcognition,andadvertingtoaseeminglyratherunspecificfeatureofperception,shared,onemightthink,bypains,moods,emotions,etc.Foramorespecificaccountofperceptualorcognitivephenomenology,allowingforadistinctionevenifbothexist,onemightadoptoneorbothoftwostrategies.Onemightpositeither,first,phenomenologicallydistinctiveobjects,orintentionalcontents,ofperception(orofthought),or,second,adistinctivewayobjectsare(re-)presented,orcontentsentertained,inperception(or,again,inthought).Montague(thisissue,§4)outlinesaproposalofthefirstkind,suggestingthatvisualexperience‘hasitsowndistinctivecontent,e.g.color-shape.’Arelatedproposal,defendedinThau(2002)andGlüer(2009)isthatvisiondistinctivelyrepresents,notcolours,butcertainqualitativelypregnantappearancepropertiesorlooks.Anothersuggestioninthisveinisthatperceptiondistinctivelyrepresentsveryfine-grained,orspecific,properties,betheycolours,shapes,orappearance-propertycounterpartsofthelatter(cf.Bourget2017).Theseproposalsfacetheobjectionthatitispossiblealsotothinkoftheallegedlydistinctivepropertiesinquestion(cf.Kriegel2019).Onereplyhere,adoptedinvariouswaysbyThauandBourget,isthat,whileitisindeedpossibletothinkofthepropertiesbydescription,orbygeneralisingoverthem,thoughtorlanguagecannotachievedirectreferencetothem.Byadvertingtoadifferent,indirectwayinwhichthoughtconcernstherelevantitems,thismovehasatleastakinshipwiththesecondkindofstrategy,onthisissue,towhichweturnbelow.Analternativewaytopursuethefirststrategywouldbetoinvokenotthekindsbuttheoften-remarkedrichnessoftheelementspresentedinperception.Kriegel(2019)objectsthat,evenifthecognitivecontentofushumansiscomparativelysparse,wecanconceiveofbeingswithoutthesecognitivelimitationsyetforwhomaphenomenalcontrastremainsbetweenperceptionandcognition;further,thedistinctionbetweensparseandrichisoneindegrees,notinkind.Onelineofreplyheremightbetodisputethereliabilityofthenotedconceivabilityclaim,orinsistthat,eventheconceivedbeingsarepossible,adifferenceinrichnessmightstillmakeforaphenomenaldifferencebetweenhumanthoughtandperception.Moreover,asHume’swayofcontrastingimpressionsandideassuggest,itmightbequestionedwhetherthedifferencecouldnotbeoneofdegrees.Thesecondstrategy,foraccountingforadifferencebetweenperceptualandcognitivephenomenology,positsadistinctivewayobjectsare(re-)presented,orcontentsentertained,inperception(orthought).Thisstrategychimeswiththeideathatperceptionandcognitiondifferphenomenallyintermsofamoredirectphenomenalpresenceofanobject(propertyinstance,event,stateofaffairs,etc.)inperceptualexperience.Asitissometimesput,perceptionispresentationalwhereascognitionisrepresentational(cf.,e.g.Searle1983;Chudnoff2018).Or,asHusserl(1973/1997,14)putit,objectsatwhichoneisdirectedinperceptionarethere‘inperson’,unlikehowtheyfigureinthought,imagination,orrecollection.Yet,howissuchadifferenceinthementalrelation,ordirectedness,tobeunderstood,moreprecisely?Oneoptionherewouldbetoadverttoananti-representational,relationalviewofperceptualexperience.Onsuchaview,perceptualphenomenologyis,atleastinpart,constitutedorgroundedbyarelationofacquaintancewithcertainitemsandtheirqualities,betheyprivatesense-data(cf.,e.g.Robinson1994)orpublicobjectsorscenes,aviewsometimesreferredtoas‘naïverealism’(cf.,e.g.Brewer2011;Campbell2002;Martin2006;andTravis2013).Ifcognitionisrepresentational,andnotitselfinvolvesacquaintancewithsuchitems,itsphenomenology(ifany)couldnotbeconstitutedorgroundedinthesameway.Thisideacouldalternatively,oradditionally,beinterpretedasreferringtoadifferenceinhowthesubjectisrelatedtotheworldinperceptionandcognition,asuggestionthatwewillreturntoinSec.5below.Naiverealismimpliesthathallucinations,wherethesubjectisnotacquaintedwithpublicobjectsorscenes,cannothavethesamekindofphenomenologyasperceptions.Hallucinationshave,onsuchviews,insteadbeenunderstoodasstatesofimagination(cf.Allen2015),ordefinedintermsoftheirindiscriminabilityfromperception(seee.g.Martin2006).Suchdisjunctivismis,ofcourse,controversial(cf.e.g.Kriegel2011).Anotheroption,openwithintheframeworkofarepresentationalview,istopositadistinctiveattitude,orintentional‘mode’,ofperceptualexperience.ThusBach(2007)andRecanati(2007)consideracertaincausallyself-referentialaspectofperception,i.e.itscharacterasofbeingcaused(and,perhaps,causallysustained)bythethingsoneisperceiving,whichSearle(1983)takestobeaconditionofsatisfactionimposedbyperceptualcontent.BachandRecanatiarguethatthisconditionisbetterconstruedasaconditionofsuccessimposedbytheperceptualmode(akintohow,say,truthmaybeaconditionofsuccess,or‘aim’,imposedbythemodeofbelief).Recanati(2007,133)arguesthisfactaboutperceptualmodewouldelucidatehowsubjectsareawareoftheperceptualnatureoftheirexperience.Now,itmightberepliedthatacontent-basedcausallyself-referentialcondition,asinamerethoughtthat,say,VictoriaFallsareroaringandarecausingthisverythought,doesnotmakeobjectsimmediatelypresenttoone.Why,then,shouldamode-basedconditiondoso?Kriegel(2019)raisesthisquestion,andalsovoicesdoubtsconcerningwhetherthesortsofcausal-functional-normativerequirementsadvertedhereareapttobefirst-personallymanifest,intherequisiteway.Ifneitheroftheindicatedstrategies,foraccountingfortheputativelymanifestdifferencebetweenperceptualandcognitivephenomenology,yieldsolidresults,allhopemightnotbelostforthethoughtthattherereallyissuchadifference.AsKriegel(2019)observes,aremainingoptionistotreatthedifferenceasprimitive–asonewecannotinformativelyaccountforintermsofother,morespecificormorefundamentalfeaturesofphenomenology.Thephenomenologicalapproachtotheperception/cognitiondistinctionwouldhavealimitationiftherecanbeunconsciousperception,that,assuch,couldnotbedistinguishedfromcognitiononphenomenologicalgrounds(fordiscussionsee,e.g.PhillipsandBlock(2016),andTaylor(2020)).3.RepresentationParadigmcognitions,suchasbeliefs,arestandardlysupposedtoexemplifyaformofrepresentationthatispropositional,conceptual,anddiscursive(roughly:language-like).Giventhis,perceptionswoulddifferfromcognitions–atleast,fromsuchparadigmcognitionsasbeliefs–iftheyareeithernon-representational(cf.,e.g.Travis2013)orexemplifyanon-propositional/-conceptual/-discursivesortofrepresentation.Thissectionconcentratesonthelatteroption.Thenotionsofnon-propositional/-conceptual/-discursiverepresentationare,weshallsee,subjectofvariousdivergentconceptionsintheliterature.Itisoftenadelicatemattertokeeptrackofwhetherdiscussantsare(dis)agreeingortalkingatcrosspurposes.3.1.Non-propositionalityIfperceptionsarerepresentational,theyplausiblyhavepropositionalcontentinatleastinsomelight-weightsense.Foronething,theycanbeassociatedwithsetsofpossibleworldsinwhichtheyareveridical.Suchsetsarepropositions,onanunstructuredconception(cf.Stalnaker1998).Recentargumentsforthenon-propositionalityofperception,duetoBurge(2010a,2010b,2010c,2018)andBlock(MS),assume,however,amoredemandingconceptionofthepossessionofpropositionalcontent.Operatingwithastructuredviewofpropositions,theystressthatpropositionsadmitofthekindofstructurespecifiedinpropositionalandfirst-orderlogic,ofnegation,disjunction,conditionals,universalquantification,etc.Thereisgoodevidencetotakementalstatestobetypedbypropositionalcontent,theyargue,whenthereisgoodevidencethatthesestatesmanifestrepresentationalcapacitieswhoserepertoireincludesstateswithnegative,disjunctive,etc.contents.Goodevidenceforcapacitieswithsucharepertoireparadigmaticallyincludes(thoughisnotnecessarilylimitedto)behavioursbestexplainableintermsofinferencesthevalidityofwhichtradeonsuchlogicalstructures.Forexample,Chryssipus’slegendarydog,chasingsomething,andarrivingataforkintheroad,sniffstheonebranch,andthenstraightawaypursuestheother,abehavioursupposedlybestexplainedbyadisjunctivesyllogism.Therepresentationalcapacitiesactiveinperceptionneednot,andsooughtnot,BurgeandBlockargue,beconstruedasallowingfornegative,disjunctive,conditional,universallyquantified,ordittostructure.Block(MS)pointsoutthat,evenincaseswhereadisjunctiverepresentationmighthavebeenexpected,perceptionisundisjunctive.Considerambiguousstimuli,suchastheNeckercube.Forallthevisualcuesinthisdisplayindicate,eithertheone,ortheother,ofitssquaresidesperpendiculartothelineofslightiscloser.Yetvisiondoesnotrepresentsuchadisjunction;itflipsfromrepresentingtheoneasclosertorepresentingtheotherassuch.Itmightbeobjectedthatwecanperceiveabsences,suchas,say,mylaptop’snon-presenceonacafétable(cf.Farennikova2013),andthatsuchperceptionineffectdeploysnegation.Block(MS)repliessuchcasesarebetterconstruedasacertainrepresentationofemptiness,lackingsemanticstructure.Anotherobjectionmightbethatperceptualcontent,assuminga‘generalist’view,isexistentiallyquantified:itrepresentsthattherearesuch-and-suchthingsinfrontofone(cf.,e.g.Davies1992).Ifuniversalquantificationindicatespropositionalstatus,shouldnotexistentialquantificationdosotoo?Burge(2010a)rejectsthegeneralistview,however,arguingitisessentialtoperceptionthatitpurportstorefertoindividualobjectsorevents.Inperception,attributivessuchasredorsquarehavearepresentationalfunctionwhichconfinesthemtorepresentingthepropertyinquestioninthecontextofattributingittoaparticulargiveninademonstrativeorindexicalway:theyareconfinedtosuchelementary,noun-phraselikestructuresasthatredsquare.Incontrast,itischaracteristicofpropositionalrepresentation,Burge(2010c)argues,thatsomeattributivethereinisnotsoconfined,butcan,interalia,attributethepropertytothingsgeneralisedover(someredsquare)orrepresentthepropertywithoutmakinganypositiveattribution(thatisnotred).Again,thereis,heargues,nosufficientreasontothinktherepresentationalcapacitiesinplayinperceptionallowforsuchstructuralflexibility.3.2.Non-conceptualityEvans(1982)introducedtheterm‘non-conceptualcontent’intorecentdebates,arguingthatperceptionandbeliefshave,respectively,non-conceptualandconceptualcontent.Ontheperhapsmostinfluentialcharacterisation,contentisconceptualifmentallyentertainingitrequirespossessingtheconceptsusedinspecifyingthecontent,otherwisenon-conceptual.2Evanslinkedconceptpossessionwithmeeting‘theGeneralityConstraint’(GC),i.e.withbeingabletorecombinerepresentedelementsincertainsystematicways,e.g.beingabletorepresenttheballasabovethebrickifabletorepresentthebrickasabovetheball.MeetingGCiscloselyrelatedtohavingthepropertyFodordubssystematicity(see,e.g.Fodor2008).Now,atleastsomethinglikesystematicitymayseemtoapplytoperceptualrepresentation.Ifonecanseearedsquarenexttoagreentriangle,then,surely,onecanalsoseeagreensquarenexttoaredtriangle.Ithasbeenargued,however,thatperceptionhas,oratleastmaywellturnouttohave,sometellingexceptionstosystematicity.Heck(2007)suggeststhatperceptualrepresentationmayoperatesothatspatialrelationsarerepresentedonlyamongobjects(representedasbeing)fairlyclosetoeachother.Now,supposeaandbarefairlyclose,andbandc,butnotaandc.Then,evenifaandbarerepresentedasbeing,say,equidistantfromoneself,andb,say,asbehindc,itcannotbeperceptuallyrepresentedthataisequidistantfromoneselfwithc,orthataisbehindc.Inanothercontext,Johnsonobservesanotherputativebreachofsystematicityinperceptualrepresentation:‘althoughIcansee(imagine)asmallblackboxinsideofalargeglasssphere,IdonotthinkIcansee(imagine)alargeglasssphereinsideasmallblackbox’(2004,131).TheimplicationsofsuchputativeexamplesforadifferencebetweenperceptionandthoughtdependonthestatusandnatureoftheclaimthattheGC,orsystematicity,appliestothelatter.EvanshasbeenunderstoodtotreatGCasanaprioriconstraintonthought;adoptingsuchaview,Heckiscontenttoclaimthatperceptualrepresentationmayturnouttobespatiallyconstrainedinthewayindicated.Fodorincontrastholdssystematicitytobeanempiricallaw,admittingofcertainsortsofexceptions,asspecialsciencelawstypicallydo.Onthatview,Heck’sandJohnson’sputativecounterexampleswouldneedempiricalsupport,and,eveniftheystand,maybetreatedas,ineffect,exceptionsthatprovetherule.YetanotherpossiblelessontobedrawnfromtheexamplesisillustratedbyJohnson(2004,2015),whosecitedpointaboutperceptionisadvancedaspartofacaseforabroaderscepticismwhetheranynaturallyoccurringsystemofrepresentation,includingthoughtandnaturallanguage,issystematic.3Mandelbaum(2018)arguesperceptionhas,atleastinpart,conceptualcontent,onthegroundthatperceptuallypresenteditemsarecategorised,extremelyrapidly,undersuchbasic-levelcategoriesascar,dog,guitar,etc.Hecitesinteraliafindingsthatsubjectsareabovechanceattellingwhetherasequenceoffivepictures,eachpresentedforamere13 ms(withforwardsandbackwardsmasking,todisruptsubsequentperceptualprocessing)includedapictureof,say,acar.Cognitive,top-downprocessesoperatetooslowly,Mandelbaumargues,toaccountforsuchcategorisations.3.3.Non-discursivityTheleadingcontendersfornon-discursiveformsofrepresentation,whenitcomestothecharacterizationofperception,areanalogandiconicrepresentation.Eachofthesetwotermsareunderstoodindivergentwaysintherecentliterature.For‘analog’,onecandistinguisha‘continuity’conception,onwhichanalogsystemsallowrepresentationtovary(approximately)continuouslyalongsomedimension,anda‘mirroring’conception,onwhichanalogrepresentationalvehiclesinstantiatestructuresmakingthemisomorphicto,oratleaststructure-sensitive‘mirrorsof’,thedomainrepresented(forexample:greaterdistancesamongdotsonatubemapcorrelateswithgreaterdistancesamongstations–andrepresentrelativelengthpartlyinvirtueofthiscorrelation).4Thecontinuityconceptioncanbesetasidehere.Someconceptionsof‘iconic’,e.g.thatofBurge(2018)andBlock(MS),makeiteffectivelysynonymouswith‘analog’onthemirroringconception.Otherstreatitasstipulative(Fodor2007;Clarke2020),oratleastgenerallytrue(GreenandQuilty-Dunn2017;Quilty-Dunn2020),thaticonicrepresentationsmeetacertain‘PicturePrinciple’,notimpliedbyanalogmirroring,accordingtowhichanypartofaniconicrepresentationrepresentsapartofthescenerepresentedbythewhole(forexample,apartofapictureofalionwouldrepresent,say,itsnose).Thereisalso,asweshallsee,disagreementwhethernon-discursiverepresentationsnecessarily,oreventypically,representsseveraldimensions,suchasshape,orientation,andcolour,inaholistic,bundled-togethermanner.Beck(2019)arguesanalogperceptualrepresentationwouldofferanattractiveexplanationofWeber’slaw,i.e.thelaw,roughly,thatthejust-noticeabledifferenceinacertainmagnitudeincreasesasthemagnitudeincreases;e.g.loudtonesmustdiffermoreinloudnesstobediscriminablethansofttones.Ifloudnessisanalogicallyrepresented,therepresentationsoftwoloudnessesinstantiateastructuralcorrespondencetotheloudnesses:therepresentationalvehiclesmaybeassumedtobemoresimilarwhentheloudnessesrepresentedare(contrastthediscursiverepresentation‘49,9dB’,whicharguablyismoresimilarto‘39,9dB’than‘50dB’).Giventhatthepsychologicalprocessesoperatingontherepresentationsarenoisy,thissuggeststhat,whentheratiobetweentworepresentationsshrinks,adifferencebetweentheloudnessestheyrepresentwillbehardertodetect,asWeber’slawpredicts.Anotherargumentforanalogperceptualrepresentationadvertsto‘mentalrotation’experimentsonimagery(Quilty-Dunn2020;BlockMS).ShepardandMetzler(1971)foundthatthetimeneededtotellwhethertwolinedrawingsdepictcongruent,ormirror-reversed,figuresisproportionaltothedegreetowhichtheirdepictedorientationdiffers.Iftheprocessof‘mentallyrotating’theimaginedfigureoperatesoverrepresentationsthatinstantiatesomestructuralcorrespondenceofangularseparation,thisfindingarguablymakessense.Sincetherearereasonsforthinkingimageryandperceptionhavethesamerepresentationalformat,perceptualrepresentationisanalogtoo,orsothepresentlineofargumentconcludes.GreenandQuilty-Dunn(GreenandQuilty-Dunn2017;Quilty-Dunn2020)arguethat,althoughperceptualrepresentationisinpartanalog,perceptualobjectrepresentations(PORs)arediscursive.Theyappealinteraliatostudiessuggestingthatperceiversmaybeabletorecallonedimensionofajust-disappearedobject,suchasitsorientation,withoutrecallinganother,suchasitscolour.AssumingthisrecallexploitsPORs,PORswouldnotbeiconic,theyargue,sinceiconicrepresentationsare‘holistic’,inthesensethattheyrepresentsseveraldimensionsatonce,roughlyassomebrushstrokesrepresentshue,brightness,shape,andorientationofapicturedobject(incontrast,theword‘blue’representcolouronly).Crudely:ifpaint-likePORslingeredsoastobeaccessibleforretrievingorientation,theyshouldalsobeaccessibleforretrievingcolour.Block(MS)agreestheobjectrepresentationsinsomeofthestudiescitedbyGreenandQuilty-Dunnarediscursive,butputsthatdowntohowthesestudiesplacedemandsonworkingmemory.Invision,priortoconceptualizationinworkingmemory,iconic/analogPORsareinplay.Thisexplains,Blockargues,howobject-directedandspatially-directedaspectsofperceptioninteractinfine-grained,proportionalways,akintothosefoundinmentalrotationexperiments.Forexample,perceiversare,otherthingsequal,quickeratreactingtofeaturesappearingonanattendedobjectthantofeaturesappearingonanotherobject(evenwhencontrollingfordistance);however,withintheboundariesofanattendedobject,attentionoperatesspatiallyinaputativelyanalogway:onewouldbeproportionallyslowertoreacttoafeaturethefurtherawayitappears,onthesurfaceoftheobject,fromaninitiallyattendedlocationonitssurface.IfPORsinstantiateastructuralcorrespondencetospatialextension,andattentionalprocessesaresensitivetothisfeatureofPORs,thisproportionalitymakessense,Blockargues.Moreover,BlockobjectsthatGreenandQuilty-Dunn’sholismrequirementistoodemanding.Thoughsomeiconicrepresentationsrepresentseveraldimensionsinaholistic,bundled-upmanner(aspaintcan),theydonotallhavetodoso.Whethertheydodependsontherepresentationalcapacitiesoroperationsthatdrawonorprocesstherepresentationsinquestion,apointalsostressedbyBurge(2018).3.4.Perception-stylerepresentationoutsideperception?Theaboveindicatessomereasonsofferedforthinking(or,asthecasemaybe,doubting)thatperceptionhasnon-propositional/-conceptual/-discursiverepresentation.Evenifsuchrepresentationisnecessarytoor(partly)constitutiveofperception,itisalsoexclusivethereto?Onegroundfordoubtingthisisthatimageryarguablyexemplifiessuchrepresentation(cf.,e.g.Burge2010a;Phillips2019),asdocognitivemaps(Peacocke1992),andformsof‘corecognition’,suchaselementarynumerosityrepresentations(Carey2009;Beck2012).Ifcognitivemap-useiscognitive,orcorecognitionis(formoreonwhich,seesection4.3below),non-propositional/-conceptual/-discursiverepresentationwouldnotseparateperceptionfromcognitioninclusivelyunderstood(thoughmightstilldifferentiateitfromsuchparadigmcognitionsasbeliefs).4.CognitivearchitectureThelasttwosectionsconsideredlocalfeaturesofaspecificmentalstatetoclassifyitaseitherperceptualorcognitive.Inthissection,weconsiderapproachesthatapplysystemicallybyappealtoacognitivearchitecturethatoperateswithdistinctiveperceptualandcognitivesystems.4.1.InformationalencapsulationThemostwell-knownarchitecturalperception/cognitiondistinctionholdsthatperceptionisamodularizedsystem,whilecognitionisnot(cf.Fodor1983).Wefocusononecorepropertyofmodularsystems:informationalencapsulation.Amodularsystemisinformationallyencapsulatedinthesensethatitdrawsonlimitedandproprietarysourcesofinformation,anddistinctivealgorithmsorcomputationsthatoperateonthatinformation.Adefenderofaninformationalencapsulationdistinctionbetweenperceptionandcognitionneedstwoclaims:(1)perceptionisinformationallyencapsulated,(2)cognitionisnotinformationallyencapsulated.5Indefenceof(1),Fodorargued,forexample,thatperceptualillusions,liketheMüller-Lyer,persistevenwhentheagentknowsaboutthem.Theperceptualsystemseemstohavenoaccesstocognitiveknowledge.Consideralsohowperceptualsystemsoperateinhighlyinvariableandsystematicways,e.g.whentheyconstructshapefromshading(cf.Quilty-Dunn2020).Thesefeatureshavebeentakentoillustratethattheperceptualsystems’accessislimitedtothestateofthesensoryorgansandalimitedandproprietarystoreofinformationthatitusestointerpretorstructurethatsensoryinput(whichmaybestoredimplicitlyinthesystem;Burge2010a,p.345f;Shea2015).Indefenceof(2),Fodor(1983,105ff)claimedthatcognitivesystemsare(a)isotropic:incognitioneverythingcanpotentiallyinfluenceeverythingelse,and(b)Quinean:cognitivechangesaresensitivetoglobalproperties,suchasgeneralplausibilityorsimplicity.Yourbeliefsaboutevolution,forexample,mightdependonwhatyouthinkaboutastronomy,onyourpoliticalconvictions,oronhowmuchyouvalueasimplevsacomplexworldview.Toargueagainsttheinformationalencapsulationdistinction,onemight,inturn,argueeitheragainst(1)or(2)(orboth).Wediscusstheminturn.Challengersof(1)oftenappealtocasesofcognitivepenetration(atermcoinedbyPylyshyn1999,whoarguedagainstit).Cognitivepenetration,roughly,referstotheideathatanagent’scognitivestatesinfluenceherperceptualsystems,thusundermininginformationalencapsulation.6Earlychallengesofthistypesclaimedthatculturallyspecificperceptualcategoriesmaybelearnedthroughinfancy(Churchland1988).Morerecently,Siegel(2010)suggeststhattheacquisitionofrecognitionalcapacitiesmightcognitivelypenetrateintoperceptionandenableagentstoperceptuallyrepresentnovelhigh-levelpropertiessuchasbeingapinetree.Ithasbeenarguedthatlongtermeffectssuchasthese,though,maybeaccommodatedthroughperception-internalprocessesofperceptuallearningthussavingperceptualencapsulation(Connolly2019).Theyalsodonotviolatesynchronicinformationalencapsulation:ateachtimetheoutputoftheperceptualsystemwouldstillonlydependonwhat–atthattime–iswithinperception’sproprietaryinformationstore.Thiswouldbeenoughforadefenderoftheinformationalencapsulationdistinction.Whethertheperceptualsystemsaresynchronicallyencapsulatedisamatterofheateddebate.Someurgeareturntoimportantaspectsofthepre-FodorianNewLookpsychology(cf.Bruner1957forareview)andappealtoevidencesuggestingthatcognitivestateslikeknowledgeorbeliefmightinfluencee.g.colourperception:believethatsomethingisabananaanditlooksmoreyellow(Hansenetal.2006;Macpherson2012);believethat’ssomeoneisblackandhisfacelooksdarker(LevinandBanaji2006).Othersarguethatpopularresearchprogramssuchasthepredictivecodingparadigmshowthesynchronicpenetrabilityofperceptionandthusunderminetheinformationalencapsulationdistinction(Clark2016;Lupyan2015).Inresponse,FirestoneandScholl(2016)havedefendedthemodularityofperceptionbyallegingmethodologicalflawsintheexperimentsattemptingtoundermineit.Macpherson(2017)andDrayson(2017)havearguedthatpredictivecodingarchitecturesare,infact,compatiblewiththemodularityofperception(seealsoHohwy2013,124–126).Williams(thisissue)arguesagainstanyviewaimingtousethepredictivecodingparadigmtoreplacetheperception/cognitiondistinctionwithaunifiedinferentialhierarchy.Letusnowturntochallengesto(2):evenifperceptionweremodular,theinformationalencapsulationdistinctionwouldfailifcognitionwerealsomodular.Proponentsofmassivemodularity(Sperber2002;Carruthers2006)havearguedthatcognitionisnotonegeneralpurposesystembutatool-boxofhighlyspecializedparts.Ifthisshowedthatcognitionconsistedofmodulesthatareinformationallyencapsulatedinthesamesenseasperception,thentheinformationalencapsulationdistinctionwouldfail.Yet,manyproponentsofmassivemodularityhaveaweakenednotionofmodularityinmind(Sperber2002;Carruthers2006).Andindeed,atleastfortheprocessesinvolvedinbelieffixation,Fodorianisotropyhasbeenarguedtobehighlyplausibleandcompatiblewithsomeversionsofthemassivemodularityview(Chiappe2000;CurrieandSterelny2000;Samuels2006).Thiswouldsaveaversionoftheinformationalencapsulationdistinction.Ontheotherhand,onemightarguethatdrawingadistinctionbetweenperceptionandbelieffixationisnotthesameasdrawingtheperception/cognitiondistinction.Arguablysomesystemsarecognitiveandyetdistinctfromthe(conceptualized)belieffixationprocesses:CurrieandSterelny(2000)arguethiswithregardtomind-reading;And,arguably,corecognitionisinformationallyasencapsulatedasperception(cf.Spelke2003,31).Ifso,thentheinformationalencapsulationdistinctionarguablydrawsthedistinctioninthewrongplace.4.2.Attention:betweenperceptionandcognitionAttentionisamentalcapacitythatisinfluencedbyandinfluencesbothperceptionandcognition:attentivelisteningtosomething,forexample,isanauditory–perceptual–statethataffectswhatyouwillcometoknow,butitisalsointurninfluencedbyyourintentionsandpriorknowledge(Wu2014;Watzl2017).Giventhatattentionconnectsperceptualandcognitiveprocessing,itprimafacieraisesdoubtsaboutwhethertheyareseparatesystems.Thefirstissueinthisregardconcernswhethertheeffectsofattentiononperceptionundermineitsinformationalencapsulation.ManywritersstartingfromPylyshyn(1999)havesuggestedthatitdoesnot,sincetheeffectsofattentionaremerelyselective:attentionleavestheinternaloperationsoftheperceptualmoduleintact,andoperatesbyeitherchangingtheinputtotheperceptualsystemsorhowitsoutputistakenupbycognition.Onthisconception,attentionisanimportantinterfacebetweentheseparatesystemsofperceptionandcognition.Yet,recentworkshowsthatattentionalsoaffectsperceptualprocessingonalllevels:itaffectstuningcurvesinthevisualcortex(cfMartinez-TrujilloandTreue2004)andtheassignmentofobjectboundaries(cf.DriverandBaylis1996);itmodulatesperceptualprecision(Ling,Liu,andCarrasco2009),changespriorityweights(cf.SerencesandKastner2014;Watzl2017)andmodulatesperceptualappearancesofcontrast,size,depth,andothers(forareviewseeCarrascoandBarbot2019;cf.BeckandSchneider2017foradivergingview).Onthebasisofsuchaffects,Mole(2015),Wu(2017),andBlock(2016,MS)arguethattheeffectsofattentiononperceptionshowthatitisnotinformationallyencapsulated(cf.alsomanycommentariesonFirestoneandScholl2016).Gross(2017)andQuilty-Dunn(2020)haverespondedthatthewayattentionaffectsperceptioniscruciallydifferentfromthewaycognitivestatesinfluenceeachother:itseffectsarenotsystematicallyandcoherentlycontent-based(Gross)andare‘notaformofinformationaccess’(Quilty-Dunn,2020342).Ifthatwereright,thenwhileattentionindeedletsinformationflowfromcognitiontoperceptionandback,thisisbetterconceptualizedastalkbetweentwofundamentallydistinctsystemsratherthanaformofintegrationthatthreatenstheirdistinctness.Onemight,though,callthisconclusioninquestion:bychangingpriorityweightsinperception,attentionre-structurestheinput-outputfunctionoftheperceptualsystems,whichisachangetotheinformationaccessedbyperceptionimplicitly(cf.Wu2014;Watzl2017).Thewaycognitivestatesaffecteachotherisoftensimilarlyimplicit:yourpoliticalconvictions,forexample,makecertaininferencesorthoughtsmoreaccessibleorsalient(cf.Kahan2012).IfcognitionisisotropicandQuineaninthissense(wereonecognitivestateoraglobalpropertyinfluencesanotherthrougheffectsonaccessibilityrelations;cf.Camp2019on‘frames’),thenattentionmight,afterallshowthatthereisnodeepdistinctionininformationalencapsulationbetweenperceptionandcognition.4.3.OtherarchitecturalapproachesTheinformationalencapsulationdistinction,whilethemostpopular,isnottheonlyarchitecturalapproachtotheperception/cognitiondistinction.Onemightarguethatevenifperceptionisnotinformationallyencapsulateditmaystillpossessdistinctive‘architecturalconstraints’(Green2020):itmighthaveaspecificandproprietaryinformationstorage(aperceptualdatabase),withspecificandproprietaryalgorithmsusingthatstorage(perceptualcomputations).Howinterestinganddeeptheperception/cognitiondistinctionis,onapproachesinthiscategory,woulddependonthedifferenceinthearchitecturalconstraintsonperceptionandthoseoncognition.Oneapproachinthisbroadfamilyhasbeenmentionedintheliterature:onemightpointtoaclusterofpsycho-physicalpropertiesthatpointtoadistinctivestyleofperceptualcomputation.Thesewouldinclude,forexample,processesofadaptationthathavebeenclaimedtobe‘essentialtohowvisionworks’(Webster2015,547;cf.Fish2013;Block2014)andshowacharacteristictimecourseunlikee.g.cognitivecontrasteffects(seeBlockMSinresponsetoHelton2016).Block(MS)mentionsalsopopout,binocularrivalery,andothermarkers.Onthisapproach,theperceptualsystemis,roughly,identifiedaswhatproducesthoseeffects.Suchbroadlyoperationaldefinitionsarenotunusualinpsychology.Theapproachwouldalsoresemblea(homeostatic)propertyclustertheoryofnaturalkindsasdevelopedbyBoyd(1999)andappliedtoperceptionbyTaylor(2020).7Amoredevelopedalternativearchitecturalapproach,though,isGreen’s(2020)dimensionrestrictionhypothesis.Onthisview,perceptionbutnotcognition‘isconstrainedtocomputeoveraboundedclassofdimensions’(ibid.)suchasbasicperceptualqualities(likesize,orientation,brightness,saturationorspeed)togetherwithlimitedsetofperceptualcategories(likefacialexpression;cfalsoMandelbaum2018).WhetherGreen’shypothesis,intheend,canexplaincaseslikethefamousDalmationdoghasbeendoubted(BlockMS).Further,whileGreenarguesthatthemodulesproposedbyproponentsofmassivemodularityarenotdimensionallyrestrictedinthissense,onemightwonderwhetherthesameistrueofSpelke’sandCarey’scorecognitionsystems(seeabove).Ifthosecameoutasdimensionrestrictedandcountedascognitive(thoughe.g.Block(MS)arguesthattheymaybebetterviewedasperception/cognitionhybrids),thenGreen’sapproachmightfailtodistinguishperceptionfromatleastsomeformsofcognition.5.World-RelationTheprevioussectionsaimedatdistinguishingperceptionfromcognitioneitherbysuchoftheirrespectivefeaturesastheirphenomenologyorwayofrepresenting,orbyhowtheyrelatetoeachother(e.g.whethertheyareencapsulated).Anothercriterion,though,looksathowperceptionandcognitionareeachconnectedtotheworld.Thegeneralideawouldbethatperceptionandcognitionarerelatedtotheworldinfundamentallydifferentways.Amorespecificversionoftheideaisthatperceptionoffersaparticularlystrongorintimateconnectiontotheworld.Thisideacouldbemotivatedbythethoughtthatinperception,theworldimpingesonoursensesandsoisrevealedorpresentedtous.Thisideacouldtakemanyforms.Insection2abovewepresentedtheoriesaccordingtowhichthephenomenalcharacterofperceptionis,atleastinpart,constitutedbyarelationofacquaintancewitheitherprivatesense-data,ortoeverydayobjectsand/orscenes.Therewehighlightedtherelationalcharacterofthephenomenalcharacterofperceptualexperienceasameansofdistinguishitfromcognition,butonemightalsoemphasisethatacquaintanceisauniqueworld-relation.AccordingtotheNaïveRealist,theworld-relationisanintrinsicfeatureofperceptualstates.Aprivilegedperceptualworld-relationcouldalsobemotivatedbyepistemologicalconsiderations.Forexample,Johnston(2006)andChudnoff(2018)claimthatperception,butnotcognitivestateslikebeliefs,disclosetruth-makersofpropositions.However,evenphilosopherswhodonotarguethattheperceptualrelationoughttobeunderstoodintermsofacquaintancehaveemphasisedtheimportanceoftheperceptualrelationforunderstandingthenatureofperception.Walton(1984),Siegel(2010),Tye(2011)andSundberg(2019)talkof‘perceptualcontact’.Schellenberg(2018),similarly,talksofusdiscriminatingandsinglingoutparticulars(objectsandpropertyinstances)inexperienceasaresultofusbeingperceptuallyrelatedtosuchparticulars.Giventhattherelationisdescribedasperceptualcontact,andasaperceptualrelation,itmightbetemptingtointerpretthisasreferringtoatypeofrelationwhichisexclusivetoperception.However,thisisnotsomethingwhichisexplicitlydefendedinthecitedliterature.Whatwouldbeneededisanargumenttotheeffectthatthetypeofrelationinvolvedinperceptualcontact/theperceptualrelationissuchthatitcannotrelatecognitioninasimilarway.Whatwouldthisperceptualcontact/perceptualrelationbe,ifitisnotacquaintance?Onemightbetemptedtothinkthatperceptualcontact/perceptualrelationisaspecialformofcausalrelation.However,ifacausalrelationistoexplainthespecialwaythatperceptionrelatesustotheworld,thenthatcausalrelationhastobesomethinguniquetoperception.Afterall,objectsandfeaturesintheworldcausebeliefsandothernon-perceptualstatesaswell.Further,anobject,orafeaturemightcauseaperceptualexperienceinascenariowherewewouldhesitatetosaythatthatsubjectperceives,i.e.isperceptuallyrelatedto,thatobjectorfeature.Asitissometimesput:therecouldbedeviantcausalchains(seee.g.Peacocke1979andPrice1998).Manysuggestionsforwhatcharacterisessucha‘non-deviant’causalchainhavebeengiven.Somehaveinsistedthattherightmechanismhastobeinvolved,8someinsistthatthecausalrelationhastoallowforaspecificfunction(e.g.playingacertainroleinguidingaction),9andothersemphasiseasystematicdependence(e.g.counterfactualdependence),10whileSundberg(2019)suggeststhatthemostplausiblealternativedrawson,andcombines,allthreesuggestions.Evenso,itisnotobviousthatsuchanon-deviantcausalchainwouldbeexclusivetoperceptualcontact,norisitexplicitlyclaimedtobesointhecitedliterature.Pepp(thisissue),however,asameansofansweringthequestionofwhetherwecanseethroughphotographsandpaintings,explicitlydiscusseswaysofdistinguishingperceptualcontactfromcognitivecontactbasedonvariousstrategies,e.g.basedonphenomenology,basedonencapsulationandbasedonstimulus-dependence.Thefirstandsectionoptionlinkcloselywithissuesinsections2and4above,respectively;wewillnowconsiderthethird.TworecentdefendersoftheideathatperceptionistobedistinguishedfromcognitionintermsofaspecificcausalrelationareBeck(2018),whoholdsthatthedefiningfeatureofsenseperceptionis‘stimulus-dependence’,inthesenseofbeingcausallysustainedbyproximalstimuli,andPhillips(2019),whoarguesthatthedefiningfeatureofsenseperceptionis‘stimulus-control’.AccordingtoBeck,‘perceptualstatesaredependentonastimulus,orarestimulus-dependent,inawaythatcognitivestatesarenot’(Beck2018,1f.).Similarly,Phillipsclaimsthat‘aprocessisperceptualjustincaseithasthefunctionofproducingrepresentationsofenvironmententitiesbybeingcausallycontrolledbythoseproximalstimulithattheseentitiesproduce’(Phillips2019,7).AsBeck(2018,2f.)pointsout,thissuggestionhassomeintuitiveappeal.Forexample,itoffersawayofelucidatingthewayperceptionistiedtooursensoryorgans(onthis,seealsoPhillips2019,9f.),anditreflectstheideathatperceptionistiedtothehere-and-nowinawaythatcognitionisnot.11Thereare,however,atleasttwochallengesforthissuggestion,andforaccountsfocusingonaworld-relationingeneral:hallucinationsandworld-relatedcognition.Letusconsidertheminturn.First,wemightwanttoclassifyhallucinationsasperceptual,ratherthancognitive,mentalstates.However,asubjectwhosuffersahallucinationisnotrelatedtoanobjectintheworld,soifaworldrelationisthedefiningfeatureofperception,thenhallucinationcannotbeperceptual.Oneoptionistoacceptthisandembracedisjunctivism.(Seesection2above.)However,adefenderofthestimulus-dependenceviewisnotforcedtoacceptdisjunctivism.Whileitistruethatahallucinatoryexperienceisnotstimulus-dependent,suchamentalstatecouldstillbetheresultofamechanismwiththefunctiontobestimulus-dependentinthewaythatisrequiredforperception,asBeck(2018)pointsout.Similarly,onSchellenberg’s(2018)account,wherethedefiningfeatureofperceptionisacapacitytodiscriminateandsingleoutparticularsasaresultofbeingperceptuallyrelatedtosuchparticulars,Schellenbergarguesthatincasesofhallucinationthesubjectemploysthesametypeofcapacity,or,atanyrate,thesameunderlyingmechanism,withoutactuallydiscriminatingandsinglingoutanyparticular.Inthesuccessfulcase,themechanismperformsaccordingtofunction,andintheunsuccessfulscenario(hallucination)itmalfunctions.Thesuccessofthistypeofresponsedependsonwhetherwefinditplausiblethatwecanindividuatemechanismsaccordingtothesetypesoffunctions.Asecondchallengeconcernswhethertheworld-relationinquestionisexclusivetoperception.Ifcertaincognitivestatesarestimulus-dependentinthewaythatperceptionis,thentheobtainingofthatworld-relationisnotsufficientforastatetocountasperceptual.Withrespecttostimulus-dependence,Beck(2018)grantsthatcertaincognitivestates,specificallyperceptuallygroundeddemonstrativethoughts,arestimulus-dependent.AdoptingBurge’s(2010a)viewofperceptualrepresentationascombingdemonstrative-referential(that)andattributive(red,square)elements,heneverthelesspositsthisdifference:inperception,afunctiontobestimulus-dependentappliesnotonlythewholeperceptualstateand(inparticular)itsdemonstrativecomponentfunctionbutalsotoitsattributiveelement;inthedemonstrativethoughtonlythedemonstrativecomponent,notitsattributiveelement,canbeassignedsuchafunction.6.Theshapeofanaccountoftheperception/cognitiondistinction:someoptionsTheprecedingsectionsindicatesomeoftherichvarietyofaccountsoftheperception/cognitiondistinctioninevidenceinrecentwritings.Thissectionseekstomapoutsomeofthemaindimensionsalongwithsuchaccountsdifferanddistinguishessomegeneraltypesofapproaches.6.1.Whatnotionsofperceptionsandcognitionareinplay?First,whatsortsofcategoriesofperceptionandcognitionaretheprimarytargets?Onebroaddivisionhereisbetweenthecategoriesoffolkpsychologyandthoseofcognitivescience(experimentalpsychology,neuroscience,etc.).Theformerarepersonallevel;arguably,paradigmaticallyconscious;atissueintraditionalepistemology,asbearersorprovidersofsuchstatusesasjustificationorreasonability.Thelattermaybesub-personal(althoughneednot);areoftensupposedtoleavethequestionofconsciousnessopen,ifnotresolvedinthenegative;notnecessarilysupposedtobeeitherthebearers,orproviders,oftheepistemicstatusesfamiliarfromtraditionalepistemology(thoughfornaturalizedepistemologists,andothers,theymayofcoursehaveimportantepistemicroles).Anaccountthatlimitsitselftoaffirmingphenomenologicaldifferencesbetweenperceptionandcognitionasdiscussedinsection2,ortomakingphenomenologicallybasedclaimsaboutrepresentationaldifferences(e.g.argumentsfornon-conceptualcontentbasedonphenomenologicalclaimsofrichnessorfinenessofgrain,cf.section3)plausiblytargetfolk-psychologicalnotions.Incontrast,viewsthatrestrictthemselvestopositingdifferencesinrepresentationalformat(e.g.thedebateregardingPORsdiscussedinsection3.3)orcognitivearchitecture(section4)basedoncognitivescientificfindingstradeincognitivescientificcategories.Anaccountadvertingtostimuluscontroldiscussedinsection5maydosointheaimofoutliningeitherafolk-psychological,oracognitivescientific,categoryofperception.Substantiveissuesarisehereconcerningtherelationbetweenthefolkpsychologicalandthecognitivescientificcategories.Supposeanaccountinthefirstinstancetargetsthelatter.Oneoptionthenwouldbetoholdthatthefolkpsychologicaldistinction(s)fall(s)neatlyoutofthecognitivescientificone.Anotheroptionwouldbethatthefolkdistinctionshouldberesponsivetowhateverisfoundatthecognitivescientificlevel,butthatthismightentailsomerealignmentorreconceptionofthefolknotion,sayintheformofsomeconceptualengineering,orasomewhatrevisionaryreduction.12Athirdoptionistoregardthefolklevelasautonomous(cf.,e.g.McDowell1994).Onsuchaview,folkpsychologicalnotionscanbedistinguishedintermsof,say,phenomenologicalfeaturesorepistemicroles,withnoneedtoawaittheresultsofcognitivescientificinquiry.Thatwouldraisetheprospectthattherebeingseveral,non-coincidingperception/cognition-distinctions.Thiswouldbeaformofpluralism,atypeofviewtowhichwereturnbelow.6.2.States,processes,systems,orcapacitiesSecond,whatontologicalcategoryofthingsaretheprimarytargetsoftheaccounts?Dothey,inthefirstinstance,aimtodistinguishmentalcapacities,systems,processesorstates?Accountsadvertingtophenomenology,ortorepresentationalformatorcontent,invokewhatareusuallyconsideredfeaturesofmentalstates.13Appealstocognitivearchitectureoraspecificinformationprocessingprofilemeanwhiledistinguishmentalcapacitiesorsystems.Thecriterionofstimuluscontrol,asformulatedinBeck(2018)andPhillips(2019),issometimesappliedtoprocesses,sometimesstates,andsometimestoeitherstatesorprocesses.Thecriterionappealshowevertoacertainfunction,viz.ofbeingcausallycontrolledbycertainsortsofinput,thatarguablyisrealizedbycertainsystemsthatcauseandsustainrepresentationalstates(cf.Beck2018,9).Moreover,thecriterionwould,atfirstblushanyhow,seemtobecompatiblewiththerebeingnodifference,inphenomenal,representational,orintrinsiccharacteristics,betweenperceptualandcognitivestates.Howdeepthedifferenceshererundependshoweveronvariousquestionsaboutthenaturesofthefeaturesinvoked.Representationalformatsandcontents,forexample,arewidelysupposedtodepend,atleasttosomeextent,onfunctionalrole,vis-à-vissensoryinputs,behaviouraloutputs,andotherstates,arolethatmightbeheldtobemediatedorimplementedbymentalsystemsorcapacities.Thesamemightgoforphenomenalcharacter,e.g.ifitisgroundedonrepresentation(thoughsuchviewsareofcoursenotoriouslycontested).Thus,adistinctionbetweensensoryandcognitivesystemsdrawninitiallyintermsoftheirinformationprocessingprofile,orstimulus-dependence,mayturnouttohaveimplicationsfortherepresentationalorevenphenomenalcharacteristicsofthepsychologicalstatesinwhichtheytrade,orviceversa.Atthesametime,thechoiceofprimarytargetalongthisdimensionofontologicalcategorymayturnouttobeconsequential.OnonereadingofthebroadlyKantianviewofferedbyMcDowell(1994,2013),themoreimportantdifferencesinthisterrainarebetweenthefacultiesofsensibilityandunderstanding,characterizedrespectivelybyreceptivityandspontaneity,ratherthanamongmentalstatesofperceptionandjudgement,inasmuchaseachofthelatterdependontheco-operationofthenotedfaculties(cfalsoMontaguethisissue).Onsuchaview,theremightbenoclearrepresentationalperception/cognitiondistinction,whiletherestillwouldbeadistinctionbetweencognitiveandperceptualcapacities.6.3.Howmanydistinctions,andonwhatground(s)?Afinalquestionconcerns:howmanydistinctionsaretobedrawninthisterrain?Istherenointerestingorprincipleddistinctionbetweenperceptionandcognition(eliminationism),orone(monism),orseveral(pluralism)?Wehavealreadyseenonereasonforaformofpluralism,viz.thatcognitivescientificandfolkpsychologicaldistinctionsbetweenperceptionandcognitionmayturnoutnottocoincide.Indiscussionofthevariousfeaturesinsections2–5aboveapotentialcaseforeliminationismmayhavebeenfoundtobebrewinginthevariousdoubts,thereindicated,concerningwhetherthosefeaturesallowforaneatseparationofperceptionfromcognition.Whethermonism,pluralism,oreliminationismisfavoured,akeyquestionis,ofcourse,onwhatground,orgrounds,thedistinction(s)is(are)drawn,ordenied.Centraloptionshereincludethevariousfeaturesreviewedintheprevioussections.Aroughdistinctionmaybedrawn,moreover,between‘pure’views,appealingtoonetypeoffeature(say,representation),and‘mixed’views,invokingseveral.14Argumentsforeliminationismtendtofocusonagiventypeoffeature.Clark(2016),Lupyan(2015),andothersdefendeliminationismoninformationprocessinggrounds,invokingwidespreadtop-downprocessing(cf.alsoShea2015).Sucheliminationistarguments,targetingagiventypeoffeature,needasuppositionthatadifferenceinrespectofthattypeoffeatureisatleastnecessaryforaprincipledperception/cognitiondistinction.Thatsuppositionmaybecalledintoquestionfromthestandpointofsomemixedviews,holdingthat,althoughnosinglefeatureneatlyseparatesbetweenperceptionandcognition,some,tolerablyunifiedclusteroffeaturesmaymarkouttheonefromtheother(cf.Taylor2020).Acomprehensivecaseforeliminationismoughttobemixedinthesenseofseekingtoshowthatthereisnoprincipledperception/cognitiondistinctiontobedrawn,eitherintermsofanysingletypeoffeature,orongroundsofanynon-gerrymanderedcombinationofsuchfeatures.Oneroutetopluralismisthroughamixedview.Forexample,asnoted,itcouldbeheldthereareviabledistinctionstobedrawnatbothfolkpsychologicalandcognitivescientificlevels,ondiversegrounds,thatareunlikelytocoincide(cf.Carranante2020).AnotherformofmixedpluralismmightbediscernedinBurge,who,ontheonehand,distinguishesperception,astiedtoasensemodality,frompre-conceptualcognitionsimplicatedinplanningandnavigation,asinter-oramodal(Burge2010c,46–47;2014,574),and,ontheotherdistinguishesperception,asnon-propositional,frombasicperceptuallybasedbelief,aspropositional(2014,575).Pluralism,though,canalsobemotivatedwithinapureview.ThepluralismofPhillips(2019),forexample,distinguishesanarrower,modalityspecific,andabroader,modalitygeneral,categoryofperception,againstcorrespondinglybroaderandnarrowercategoriesofcognition,wherebothdistinctionsrelyonastimulus-controlcriterion.Someargumentsformonismarepure.Pylyshynarguesearlyvision–or‘“vision”inthecorrectusage’(Pylyshyn1999,405)–isdiscontinuousfromcognitionbyvirtueofcognitiveimpenetrability.15Likewise,Block’s(MS)contentionthatperceptionisconstitutivelyiconic,non-conceptual,andnon-propositional,whilecognitionconstitutivelyisneither,is,onthefaceofit,ofthepurevariety.16Monism,though,couldalso,assuggested,bedefendedasamixedview,e.g.byarguingthatthedifferentpropertiesusedtodistinguishperceptionfromcognitionformasingle(arguablyhomeostatic)cluster.Theissuehere,assomeoftheabovehashinted,connectswiththemetaphysicsofkinds.Whetherthereareanyprincipled,interestingdistinctionsbetweenperceptionandcognitionobviouslydependonwhat‘principled,interesting’requires.Manywouldagreethedistinctionshouldbeinnaturalkind,inasuitablybroadsensethatcontrastswiththegruesome,gerrymandered,orentirelyconventional(cf.BirdandTobin2017).Yetthisbroadnotioncanbevariouslyfleshedout.Shouldweexpecttheretobeanessence,perhapsofarelativelysimpleandunderlyingkind,thatgroundstheotherfeaturesandrolesofperceptionandcognitionrespectively?Ormayweexpectonlyalooserclusterofproperties,perhapshomestaticallyregulated,foreachkind(cf.Boyd1999).Onayetweaker,moreabundant,view,suchasthepromiscuousrealismofDupré(1993),realityisrifewithcross-cuttingdistinctionsthatneverthelessmaydeservethetitleofnaturalkindswithinoneoranotherofadiverserangeofexplanatoryprojects.Althoughthechoiceamongsuchviewsdoesnotnecessarilymapinanystraightforwardwayontotheoptionswehavechartedinthissection,someprimafaciequestionsoffitdoarise.Forexample,ifkindsneedunderlyingessences,howwouldthatfitwithdrawingthedistinctionin(apparentlysuperficial)phenomenologicalterms?Ifkindsareclustersofproperties,shouldweexpectthedistinctiontorestonjustonerespectofpsychologicaldifference,andnotamixthereof?Ifrealityispromiscuousaboutdistinctionsinkind,whataretheprospectformonism,orevenatightlycurtailedformofpluralism(andwouldapromiscuouspluralismmakeanyclaimseliminationistswanttodeny)?Aviewoftheperception/cognitiondistinctionwouldnot,then,affordtoremainneutralconcerningthenatureofkinds.6.4.ClosingremarksThisreviewhas,ofcourse,scratchedonlysomeupperlevelsofthesoilsandrootsystemsthatemergewhenwebegintodigintotheperception/cognitiondistinction.Theincreasedexplorationoftheseissuesinrecentyearspromisestodeliverasharpenedsensenotonlyofthestructuresandcomplexitieslurkingbeneath,butalsoofwhatfruitandramificationsthedistinctioncansupport.Asnotedattheoutset,perceptionandcognitionhaveoftenbeenassignedsharplydifferentroles,inepistemology,theoriesofmentalcontent,andelsewhereinphilosophy.Howthoserolesinteractwiththenatureoftheperception/cognitiondistinction,whichwehavefocusedonhere,isanopenquestion.Theinterestintheexplorationliespartlyinthenewlightitmaythrowonthesematters.AcknowledgementsTheauthorswouldliketothanktheparticipantsattheThoughtandSenseConference,andthemembersofOsloMindGroup(OMG)forfeedbackonthecontentofthispaper.WewouldliketospecificallythankNedBlockforsharinghismanuscriptwithus,PetterSydhagen,thevisitorsandguestspeakersattheThoughtandSenseproject,andtheCentrefortheStudyofMindinNature(CSMN)foritssupport.DisclosurestatementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthor(s).AdditionalinformationFundingResearchforthispaperhasbeenfundedbytheResearchCouncilofNorway(the‘ThoughtandSense’project,grantno:240645).Notes1Thereviewdoesnotpurporttobeexhaustive.Forreasonsofspace,wesetaside,amongotherthings,theviewthatperceptionislinkedtospecificsensorymodalitieswhilecognitionisamodal(cf,McFarlandandCacace1999;Burge2010c,46–47;Burge2014,574;andPhillips2019fordiscussion),andtheidea,inMcDowell’sinfluentialaccount,thatperceptualexperienceandthought,whilstbothconceptual,differinbeingrespectivelypassiveandactive(McDowell1994,10–13;McDowell2019,391).2Fordiscussionofvariousconceptionsofnon-conceptualcontent,see,e.g.,Peacocke1992;Heck2000;Speaks2005.3OntheroleofGCfortheattributionofnon-conceptualcontent,andthenatureofthought,seealso(Beck2012).4Forthisdistinction,andreferencestoleadingexamplesofeachconception,see(Beck2019,331,nt.23).5Shecanacceptthattherearealsoother,non-cognitiveandnon-perceptualmodules(e.g.alanguagemodule;Fodor1983;Mandelbaum2018,11).6ForvariousconceptionsofcognitivepenetrationseeStokes2013.7Taylorthenusesittoarguethatallegedcasesofunconsciousperceptionarebestseenasindeterminatecasesofperception.Seealsosect.6.3.8Chisholm(1957)defendssuchanaccount,andPrice(1998)mentionssuchasanalternativebutdoesnotintheendendorseit.9SeeforexampleCoates(2000),Grice(1961),O’Shaughnessy(1992),Price(1998)andDavies(1983).10SeeforexampleLewis(1980,2000),Tye(1982),andMacphersonandBatty(2016)fordifferentversionsofsuchanaccount.11Strictlyspeaking,duetothetime-laginvolvedintheprocessesconnectingproximalstimulitoperceptualstates,andduetothefinitespeedofthetransferofenergy(e.g.light),perceptionisperhapsbestunderstoodasaconnectiontosomethinginthepast,i.e.,betweenwhatishere-and-nowandwhatisthen-and-there(seeSuchting1969foranearlyinterpretationofthetemporalextensionofperceptionalongtheselines).Admittedly,thetime-lagismuchgreaterforperceptionofdistalstimulilikestars,but,duetothefinitespeedofnervesignals,itispresentalsofortheperceptualprocessingofproximalstimuli.Nevertheless,thedriftofBeck’spointstands:perceptionseemstiedtoaspecifictemporallocationinawaythatcognitionisnot.12Carranante(2020)explicitlytakesaconceptualengineeringapproach.Shearguesthatitdeliversmanydifferentusefulconceptsofperception.SeealsoBlock(MS,75–77)forthesuggestionthatsomeconceptualengineeringmightbecalledforalreadywithincognitivescientificapproachestoperception,arguingthattheconceptofperceptionmayneedtobe‘clarified’(ashecallsit)toexcludecertainstateswhereimagerysuperimposesonperception,therebytopreserveacomparativecleanjointwithcognition.13Tosimplify,wedonotdistinguishbetweenmentalstatesandeventshere.14Thedistinctionisroughsincetheindividuationof‘types’offeatureshereobviouslyisrough.Besides,somefeaturesareinternallydiverse.Representationforexamplecoversissuesofcontentaswellasofvehicle.15Incontrast,theclaiminFodor(1983)thatperceptiondiffersfrom(central)cognitioninbeingmodularisbetterseenasamixedview.Althoughencapsulation(amodeofinformationprocessing)isahallmarkofmodularity,Fodorianmodularityincludesaclusteroffurthermarks,concerningtheformatorcontentsofoutputs,domainspecificity,ontogenesis,etc.16ThoughBlockcertainlythinkstheserepresentationalfeaturesarekeytogroundingadifferenceinkindbetweenperceptionandcognition,headdsthatperception,asagainstcognition,isalsocharacterisedbyhavingafunctionalroleofinformingusaboutthepresentgoings-oninthenearbyenvironment,andhavinganappropriatesortofcausalrelationtotheobjectstheyconcern(MS,ch.1).Oninspection,then,hisviewisnotentirelyunmixed. 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